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Numbers 168. Report of Major
General George G. Meade, U. S. Army, commanding Fifth Army Corps, with
correspondence.
CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May,
12, 1863.
GENERAL: I have the honor to
submit, for the information of the commanding general, the following
report of the part taken by the Fifth Corps, under my command, in the
recent operations at Chancellorsville and on the right bank of the
Rappahannock:
In accordance with the orders
of the commanding general, the corps was put in motion for Kelly's
Ford on the 27th ultimo, bivouacking for the night at Hartwood Church.
The next day it followed the
Twelfth Corps, reaching Kelly's Ford and its vicinity that night.
On the 29th, the First and
Second Divisions (Sykes' and Griffin's) crossed the Rappahannock as
soon as the Twelfth Corps had cleared the bridge, which was about 11
a.m., and marched to Ely's Ford, on the Rapidan. The column was
preceded by a detachment of cavalry, commanded by Colonel Devin, Sixth
New York Cavalry, placed under my direction by Brigadier-General
Pleasonton. On reaching Richardsville,
Colonel Devin detached a squadron to Ellis' and Richards'
Fords, accompanied by Captain A. Moore, aide-de-camp, who surprised
the pickets of the enemy at Richards' Ford, capturing officers and
some 35 enlisted men.
On reaching the Rapidan, at 5
p.m., two squadrons of cavalry were pushed across, which soon drove
off the few mounted men of the enemy who were keeping a lookout for
our approach. The cavalry was immediately followed by Griffin's and
Sykes' divisions, which forded the stream, notwithstanding it was 3
feet deep, with a very rapid current. Both divisions were bivouacked
on the right bank of the Rapidan by midnight.
The Third Division (Humphreys')
had been left at the Rappahannock, to cover the passage of our trains
and assist in taking up the bridges. This duty was not accomplished
until late in the night, at which time Humphreys commenced his march
to rejoin the command, but, owing to the darkness of the night and the
ignorance of his guides, he lost his way, and did not reach the
Rapidan until after the departure of the column.
Before daylight on the 30th,
two squadrons of cavalry were sent out, with instructions for one to
push on in the direction of Chancellorsville, the other to take the
road to the United States Ford, after crossing Hunting Creek; both to
drive in the enemy's pickets, if encountered and pursue them as far as
they could, reporting results. Just as the column of infantry was
ready to move, I received a report from Colonel Devin that he had
driven in the enemy's pickets on the United States Ford road, and had
pursued them for several miles until he had encountered the enemy in
force drawn up in line of battle to the number, he should think, of at
least a brigade. Having no reason at the time to doubt the
authenticity of this report, I concluded the enemy had become apprised
of our movement and were prepared to dispute the opening of the United
States Ford, a point of vital importance to our operations. I
therefore ordered Sykes' division, in advance, to proceed at once to
the United States Ford, and halted Griffin, after passing Hunting
Creek, to await the development of Sykes' movement.
Soon after making these
dispositions, the cavalry reported their occupation of
Chancellorsville, after a slight skirmish with a small force of the
enemy. Being satisfied from this that there could be no enemy at the
United States Ford, I pushed Griffin on to Chancellorsville, which
place he occupied at about 11 a.m., and where I was rejoined by Sykes
about 1 p.m. As soon as Chancellorsville was occupied, I directed
Colonel Devin with his whole cavalry force to send out a strong picket
on the Plank road, and to send another party out on the Banks' Ford or
River road, to feel for the enemy, and ascertain how much of our front
was uncovered.
About 3 p.m. I received a
report from Colonel Devin that he had driven in the enemy's pickets at
the Banks' Ford road, and had pursued them until he could see their
line of battle, and from the wagons visible he concluded they were
about to evacuate the position. I immediately directed General Griffin
to advance a brigade to support the cavalry, and, if practicable, to
drive in the infantry and uncover Banks' Ford.
About an hour afterward,
Griffin reported to me that he was with his brigade in the presence of
a superior force of the enemy, and that he would require support if he
had to maintain his position. I then ascertained, to my surprise, that
the cavalry, instead of going down the Banks' Ford road, as they
reported and led me to believe, had gone down the old Richmond
turnpike, which makes a detour at Chancellorsville, coming in again to
the Plank road about 3 1/2 miles from Chancellorsville. Upon referring
to Major-General Slocum (who had arrived and assumed command) the
question of withdrawing or supporting Griffin, it was determined to
withdraw him, which was accordingly done, and both divisions were
bivouacked in line of battle, the right resting on Chancellorsville
and the left extending in a northeast direction toward the river.
The division of Humphreys
bivouacked this night at Hunting Creek, some 2 miles in our rear.
The next day (May 1), under
the orders of the major-general commanding, the corps was put en route
to take a position to uncover Banks' Ford, the left resting on the
river, the right extending on the Plank road. For this purpose, Sykes'
division was ordered to advance on the old Richmond turnpike until
after crossing Mott's Run, when he was to move to the left, deploy,
and open communication with Griffin on his left and Slocum on his
right, and, when all were in position, to advance simultaneously
against the enemy, supposed to be in position from the Plank road to
the river. Griffin was ordered to move down the River or Mott road
until in the presence of the enemy, when he was to deploy, his left
resting on the river and his right extending toward Sykes. Humphreys
was ordered to follow Griffin, to be held in reserve to re-enforce
Griffin or Sykes as the exigencies might require.
These movements were commenced
about 11 a.m. Sykes moved out on the old pike, and, after proceeding
over a mile, met the enemy's skirmishers. He immediately deployed,
and, after a spirited engagement, drove the enemy for a considerable
distance.
Finding the enemy in force and
making dispositions to outflank him on both flanks, without any
communication either on the right or left with a supporting force,
General Sykes reported the condition of affairs to the major-general
commanding the army, and by him was ordered to withdraw. This he did
in good order, returning to Chancellorsville.
In the meantime the column of
Griffin and Humphreys proceeded on the River road, and had reached
Decker's house, within view of Banks' Ford, without any opposition
from the enemy, when the order of recall was received, and the column
returned to Chancellorsville.
Being directed to occupy a
line from Chancellorsville to the river, General Humphreys division
was immediately sent to occupy the extreme left of this line, on the
river bank, and directed to hold the approach to the United States
Ford by the Mott or River road, in force. General Griffin was halted
on his return march, owing to the advance of the enemy on the
withdrawal of Sykes. Griffin formed on the left of Hancock, who had
come up to relieve Sykes.
About 6 p.m. the enemy
advanced on Sykes, who had just returned to camp, who formed line
immediately, and repulsed him handsomely.
In this position the troops
bivouacked for the night, but before day-light Griffin and Sykes were
withdrawn and took up a position on the Mineral Spring road,
connecting on the left with Humphreys and on the right with French, of
Couch's corps.
The next day, May, 2, was
occupied in strengthening this position by the constructions of
rifle-pits, abatis, &c. About 5 p.m., hearing of the giving way of
the right flank of the Eleventh Corps, I moved Sykes from the left to
the right, and pushed him out on the road to Ely's Ford, in front of
the road to the United States Ford, to cover and hold the same in case
the enemy should advance, as I feared, by that road.
During the night and by early
daylight the next morning, under the order of the commanding general,
the corps moved to occupy the road from Chandler's house (white house)
to Ely's Ford, the left resting at Chandler's and the right extending
to connect with the First Corps. General Reynolds, Griffin's division,
occupied the left of this line and Sykes the right, Humphreys in
reserve, massed in rear of Sykes.
On the 3rd instant, receiving
a message from General French that he was likely to be outflanked in
his advanced position, I ordered forward Tyler's brigade, of Humphreys'
division, which advanced and engaged the enemy for over an hour, when
it was withdrawn, the commanding general having positively determined
to hold the line of the Ely's Ford road, and prohibiting the advancing
of supports to maintain the ground held by French and Tyler.
The enemy pressing vigorously
in the direction of Chancellorsville, and it becoming necessary to
evacuate that point, I detached Allabach's brigade, of Humphrey's
division, to occupy the woods between Chandler's house and
Chancellorsville until all the troops were withdrawn within a shorter
line to be occupied. In the meantime, I collected all the available
batteries, under the immediate direction of Captain Weed, chief of
artillery, Fifth Corps, and placed them in position around the white
house (Chandler's), to cover the withdrawal of our troops and check
the advance of the enemy, which duty was most successfully
accomplished, and I take this occasion to notice with commendation the
zeal, intelligence, and activity of Captain Weed.
This day (4th) we remained
quiet in our lines, strengthening them by rifle-pits and abatis. About
3 p.m. Griffin sent out a brigade (McQuade's) from his front to feel
for the enemy, who, after advancing some half a mile, driving in the
enemy's pickets and skirmishers, came upon the main body in force,
drawn up in line of battle. As the object of the reconnaissance was
accomplished by obtaining this information, the brigade was withdrawn
to our lines.
This day (5th) was occupied in
awaiting and expecting an attack from the enemy, and in opening roads
from the advanced lines to the United States Ford, for more complete
and speedy communications. The commanding general having directed the
withdrawal of the army to the left bank of the Rappahannock, and
having designated the Fifth Corps as rear guard, Humphreys' and Sykes'
divisions were put in motion just before daylight, followed by
Griffin, who kept constantly a brigade deployed in line of battle, to
cover the rear. The troops were all crossed by 9 a.m., without any
molestation from the enemy, they not following even the withdrawal of
the pickets. The pickets were withdrawn by Brigadier-General Ayres,
field officer of the day, after the rear of the column had passed
about a mile from the line previously occupied. The First Brigade,
Griffin's division, General Barnes commanding, was left to take up the
bridges and escort the pontoon train to camp. The whole command, with
the exception of this brigade, reached the old camp near Stoneman's
Switch by 6 p.m. of this date, the 6th instant.
I beg leave to refer to the
reports of the division and brigade commanders, herewith submitted,
for the details of the operations described above in general terms;
also for the honorable mention of the distinguished names of their
subordinates.
To my division commanders,
Major-General Sykes and Brigadier-Generals Humphreys and Griffin, I
have to return my thanks for their prompt and hearty support
throughout then ten days' campaign.
To the men under their command
I cannot adequate express the satisfaction with which I witnessed
their ready and cheerful obedience to all orders, their submission to
every privation and exposure, night marches in mud and rain, fording
deep streams, using the ax and the spade more than the musket, and
ready at all times to go forward and meet the enemy. It is such
service as this that tries and makes the real soldier.
I wish to bear testimony to
the credit due the Fifth Corps for its services.
To my staff, personal and
general, I am indebted for energetic and efficient support. Throughout
all the operations I was assisted by Lieutenant Cols. A. S. Webb,
assistant inspector-general, and F. T. Locke, assistant
adjutant-general; Major J. C. Biddle, aide-de-camp; Capts. J. W.
Williams, William Jay, and A. G. Mason, aides-de-camp, and Colonel A.
Ames, volunteer aide-de-camp.
I desire to call particular
attention to the intelligence and zeal exhibited by Lieutenant-Colonel
Webb, assistant inspector-general, and Colonel Ames, Twentieth Maine,
throughout the whole of the operations.
Surgeon John Moore, medical
director, was efficient and energetic in making all the required
arrangements for the care and comfort of the wounded.
Captain Smith, acting chief
commissary, rendered me every assistance in supplying the command with
subsistence.
I have also to return my
thanks to the following officers of the staff of the major-general
commanding, who were at various times assigned to my column, rendering
me great assistance in communicating with headquarters. They were
Major Sterling and Captains Moore and Cadwalader.
It is also due to the activity
and zeal of Brigadier General G. K. Warren that I should acknowledge
my indebtedness for his efficient assistance in posting the troops
when withdrawing the rear of the column.
I also desire to bear
testimony to the zeal and intelligence of Captain Comstock, Corps of
Engineers, in charge of the bridge-train at Kelly's Ford, and which
accompanied my column to the Rapidan and to the United States Ford.
Accompanying this report is a
return of the killed, wounded, and missing, amounting to 669 in all.
Among them are the names of several valuable and distinguished
officers, whose fate the country will mourn.
The accidents of service did
not permit any general engagement of the corps as a body, though each
division at various times participated in the battle.
The conduct of Sykes' division
on the 1st instant, when, in the advance on the old pike road, they
met and drove back and then held in check the enemy's advance of
superior numbers, was a brilliant operation, adding to the already
well-earned reputation of that gallant body of soldiers. So also the
advance of Tyler's and Allabach's brigades, of Humphreys' division, to
meet the advancing columns of the enemy, flushed with the success of
having compelled our line to fall back, was in the highest degree
creditable, particularly when most of this force were nine-months'
men, whose terms of service had very nearly expired.
Finally, the conduct of the
brigades of Griffin, the one advanced on the 30th [ultimo] and the
other on the 4th [instant], proved by their steadiness and coolness
that this division only wanted a fair opportunity to show that the
laurels acquired in so many previous fields were still fresh and
undimmed.
Very respectfully, your
obedient servant,
GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General, Commanding
Fifth Army Corps.
Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS,
Asst. Adjt. General, Hdqrs.
Army of the Potomac.
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